Abstract-In network link prediction, it is possible to hide a target link from being predicted with a small perturbation on network structure. This observation may be exploited in many real world scenarios, for example, to preserve privacy, or to exploit financial security. There have been many recent studies to generate adversarial examples to mislead deep learning models on graph data. However, none of the previous work has considered the dynamic nature of real-world systems. In this work, we present the first study of adversarial attack on dynamic network link prediction (DNLP). The proposed attack method, namely time-aware gradient attack (TGA), utilizes the gradient information generated by deep dynamic network embedding (DDNE) across different snapshots to rewire a few links, so as to make DDNE fail to predict target links. We implement TGA in two ways: one is based on traversal search, namely TGA-Tra; and the other is simplified with greedy search for efficiency, namely TGA-Gre. We conduct comprehensive experiments which show the outstanding performance of TGA in attacking DNLP algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
I n the era of big data, network analysis emerges as a powerful tool in various areas, such as recommendation on e-commerce websites [1] , bug detection in software engineering [2] , and behavioral analysis in sociology [3] . In particular, dynamic networks are attracting more attention recently due to their ability to model evolving complex systems. Studies on such networks mainly focus on the dynamic nature, i.e., time-varying links, which are known as dynamic network link prediction (DNLP). DNLP algorithms aim to predict the structure of networks in the near future based on historical information. Different from static network link prediction methods that typically depend on similarity indices (e.g., Common Neighbor and Resource Allocation [4] ), most DNLP algorithms are achieved through machine learning, especially deep learning based approach. For example, autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) and recurrent neural network (RNN) based deep learning model that are popular in time-series data analysis, have shown to be effective in DNLP.
Regardless of their performance, DNLP algorithms may suffer from adversarial attacks as most machine learning methods do. The exploitation of adversarial examples may expose DNLP algorithms to security threats. However, from another perspective, this property could be useful in other fields like privacy-preserving. A well designed adversarial example may protect intimate relationships from being predicted by even the most advanced DNLP approach. The target link could be hidden by linking the user to someone unfamiliar, or removing intimate links in historical interactions.
In this paper, we propose a novel adversarial attack targeting DNLP, which we refer as Time-aware Gradient Attack (TGA), to hide target links from being predicted. Benefited from the gradients generated by deep learning model, i.e., DDNE, TGA is able to find candidate links to be modified without extensive search, and perform attack at minimum cost. Considering the dynamics of networks, TGA compares the gradients on different snapshots separately rather than does simple sorting on all snapshots; furthermore, it searches candidate links across iterations to make full use of the gradients. The designed adversarial examples could degrade not only DDNE, but also other DNLP algorithms, validating the strong transferability of TGA. Overall, our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• We design TGA to generate adversarial examples based on the gradients obtained by DDNE. As far as we know, it is the first work about adversarial attacks on DNLP.
• We conduct extensive experiments on three real-world dynamic networks and compare TGA with several baselines. The results show that TGA achieves the state-of-the-art attack performance.
• We further apply the generated adversarial examples to other DNLP algorithms, such as ctRBM, GTRBM and TNE, and their effectiveness on these algorithms validates the strong transferability of TGA.
• We vary DNLP model parameters and observe several interesting phenomena which could be inspiring to future research. For example, long-term prediction is more vulnerable to adversarial attacks; while integrating more historical information can increase the robustness of DDNE.
For the rest of this paper, we first review related work in Section 2 and preliminaries in Section 3. Section 4 presents the proposed attack details, which are evaluated in Section 5.
RELATED WORK
This section briefly reviews the literature of DNLP algorithms and the related work on adversarial attacks.
DNLP. Recently, a temporal restricted Boltzmann machine (TRBM) was adopted with additional neighborhood information, namely ctRBM [5] , to learn the dynamics as well as the structural characteristics of networks. As an extension of ctRBM, GTRBM [6] combines TRBM and boosting decision tree to model the evolving pattern of each node. Besides the RBMbased methods, recurrent neural networks (RNN), like long shortterm memory (LSTM), plays an important role in other DNLP algorithms. A stacked LSTM module was applied inside the autoencoder framework to capture time dependencies of the whole network [7] , and a gated recurrent network (GRU) was used as the encoder which could relatively lower the computational complexity [6] . There are also many other methods based on random walk [8] , matrix factorization [9] and so forth [10] .
Adversarial attack. A bunch of works have explored the field of adversarial attack on graph data. Community membership anonymization was realized by connecting the target user to the one of high centrality [11] . Another method focused on disconnecting certain neighbors while adding links between different communities, with regards to the centrality of degree, closeness and betweenness [12] . In fact, community deception can be achieved by only rewiring the links inner the target community [3] . On the other hand, the emerging network embedding techniques, such as the graph convolutional network (GCN) [13] , have drawn wide attention these days. And NETTACK was proposed to generate adversarial examples with respect to graph structure and node feature to fool the GCN model [14] . Another gradientbased method called fast gradient attack (FGA) makes full use of the gradients information to choose candidate links that need modification when performing attack [15] . Not limited to the manipulation on links, adding fake nodes [16] could also minimize the classification accuracy of GCN. Apart from the attacks on GCN, some unsupervised embedding methods are also concerned, e.g., Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) based attack [17] was introduced to lower the accuracy of DeepWalk [18] and LINE [19] on link prediction task. As innovative as they are, these attack approaches are still limited to the algorithms of static networks.
PRELIMINARY AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present the definition of DNLP, as well as the adversarial attacks on it.
Dynamic Network Link Prediction
A network structure could be represented by G = {V, E}, where V = {v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v n } denotes the set of network nodes, and E ⊆ V × V represents the set of links. A directed link from v i pointing to v j is denoted by an ordered pair of nodes (v i , v j ). In this paper, we focus on the dynamic networks with fixed node set but temporal links. Such a dynamic network could be modeled as a sequence of graphs {G t−N , · · · , G t−1 }, where G k = {V, E k } represents the network's structure at the k th interval. With this, the definition of DNLP goes as follows. Definition 3.1. DNLP. Given a sequence of N graphs S = {A t−N , · · · , A t−1 }, where A k denotes the adjacent matrix of G k , the task of dynamic network link prediction is to learn a mapping S → A t , that is, a mapping from historical snapshots to future network structure.
Specifically, DNLP algorithms capture latent spatial features and temporal patterns from historical information, i.e. previous N adjacency matrices, and then are able to infer the adjacency matrix of next snapshot. A link exists between v i and v j at time t if the probability P (A t (i, j)) given by the DNLP algorithm is larger than some threshold.
Adversarial Attack on DNLP
The idea of the adversarial attack has been extensively explored in computer vision, which is typically achieved by adding unnoticeable perturbation to images in order to mislead classifiers. Similarly, adversarial network attack on DNLP generates adversarial examples by adding or deleting a limited number of links from the original network, so as to make DNLP algorithms fail to predict target linkages. Intuitively, the goal of the generated adversarial example is to minimize the probability of the target link predicted by the DNLP algorithms, which could be formalized as
S denotes the designed adversarial example. S is the perturbation introduced into S, specifically, the amount of links that need modification.
Different from the attack strategies on static network algorithms, the chosen links added to or deleted from historical snapshots are associated with temporal information. One same link on different snapshots may contribute differently in the prediction of target link, not to mention that the linkages are time-varying. Therefore, it is crucial to take time into consideration when designing the attacks.
TIME-AWARE GRADIENT ATTACK
In order to generate adversarial dynamic network with optimal link modification scheme, a naive idea is to search through permutation and combination, which however is extremely time-consuming. Fortunately, deep learning based DNLP methods produce abundant information when making predictions, i.e., the gradients, which may assist adversarial example generation. Here, we first briefly introduce DDNE and then show how it can help to generate adversarial examples. The framework is shown in Figure 1 . It should be noted that it doesn't matter which DNLP model is adopted here, as long as it can achieve a reasonable performance.
The Framework of DDNE
DDNE has a dual encoder-decoder structure. A GRU could be used as the encoder, which reads the input node sequence both forward and backward, and turns the node into lower representation. The decoder, which consists of several fully connected layers, restores the input node from the extracted features. For a node v i , the encoding process is described as
where h 
where M represents the number of layers in the decoder, and σ m denotes the activation function applied in the m th decoder layer. Here, σ m = ReLU(·) when m < M and σ M = sigmoid(·). In the training process, DDNE minimizes objective function L all which consists of three parts: an adjusted L 2 loss L s between predicted snapshot and the true one to learn the transition pattern, an adjusted L 2 loss L c between the two embeddings to capture interaction proximity and a regularization term L reg to avoid overfitting. And L all is defined as
Here, L s adds an additional weight Z(i, :) to L 2 loss in order to ease the impact of sparsity, with
On the other hand, L c imposes N ij , the amount of links between v i and v j in historical snapshots, to L 2 loss. It addresses the influence of historical connections, and is defined as
Time-aware Link Gradient
When training DDNE, we calculate ∂L all /∂W to update the corresponding weights W through stochastic gradient descent. Similarly, in adversarial network generation, we can update S(i, :) by taking ∂L all /∂S(i, :) with S(i, :) being the variable. L all integrates the information of the entire network, which makes the links that contribute the most in prediction covered among all links in S(i, :). To find out the most valuable links in target link prediction, we design L t to only take the target link into consideration. Its definition goes as follows.
withÂ t (i, j) equal to P (A t (i, j)), the probability generated by DDNE. This can make the time-aware link gradient, ∂L t /∂S(i, :), more concentrated when it is applied in target link attack. The calculation of ∂L t /∂S(i, :) follows the chain rule and the partial derivative can be obtained by calculating ∂f (S(i, :))(i, j)/∂S(i, :) with DDNE regarded as f , which is described as
Note that ∂L t /∂S(i, :) is a tensor with the same shape of S(i, :), and the element g k (i, j) represents the gradient of linkage (i, j) on the k th snapshot.
Traversal Search Based TGA
Based on the gradients ∂L t /∂S(i, :), we can find the links to be modified, so as to realize the attack. The modification involves both the magnitude and sign of g t (i, j), which decides the candidate linkages and how they should be modified, respectively. To lower the modification cost, we focus on the linkages with maximum magnitude since the changes of such linkages have greater impact on L t than the others. The sign of gradients, denoted as sign(g k (i, j)), determines whether to add or remove links. Specifically, if there is a link between v i and v j at the k th snapshot with sign(g k (i, j)) = 1, it means this link has positive effect on the prediction of the target link, and thus can be removed to lower the prediction performance; In the reverse case, suppose v i and v j are not connected at the k th snapshot but with sign(g k (i, j)) = −1, we then can add a link between v i and v j on the corresponding snapshot to realize the attack. Therefore, the modification can be simply defined aŝ
It should be noted that such a modification should be ignored when A k (i, j) = 1 and sign(g k (i, j)) = 1 (or A k (i, j) = 0 and sign(g k (i, j)) = −1). That is, we don't encourage multiple connections between a pair of nodes, neither can we remove a non-existing link.
Search across Snapshots
Within one iteration, we first sort links based on |g ij | with respect to each snapshot, and then select the qualified links with maximum |g ij | in each snapshot. We modify these candidate links based on Eq. (9). The operations are based on the hypothesis that the links on different snapshots weigh differently in prediction. When implementing the above steps, we treat the one-link modification on the target snapshot as a basic operation, called OneStepAttack, as shown in Algorithm 1. 
Search between Iterations
We iteratively add perturbations to S(i, :) when performing the attack. In each iteration, the perturbation S is designed according to the time-aware link gradients. We have two options for this, one is to use the gradients obtained in the last iteration (for higher efficiency), and the other is to re-calculate them based on the adversarial example generated in the last iteration (for higher effectiveness). Here, we use the second one. We first obtain all possible adversarial examples in γ iterations. After that, we choose the one which could achieve the minimum p ij as the final adversarial example. The procedure of our TGA-Tra is visualized in the left part of Figure 2 . For instance, when we set the number of historical snapshots n s = 2 and γ = 8, we will have 2 8 = 1024 possible adversarial examples as candidates, and the red doted box in Iteration 8 is the finally chosen one. Clearly we can get the attack route through backtracking. The details of TGA-Tra are presented in Algorithm 2.
Greedy Search Based TGA
TGA-Tra could be effective since it compares a large number of modification schemes, but it is of relatively high time complexity, especially for large N and n s . Taking the partial derivatives of the input pairs of nodes (op1) and sorting them in descending order (op2) are the two most time-consuming steps when performing the attack. For TGA-Tra, we need to repeat the above two steps at most 2 γ−1 n s times to hide the target link from being predicted, which is barely affordable in real cases. We thus propose another greedy search method, namely TGA-Gre, as shown in the right part of Figure 2 . Here, in each iteration, we select the one achieving the minimum p ij as the most effective adversarial example, which is further considered as the input of next iteration. The details of TGA-Gre are presented in Algorithm 3.
For a target link (i, j), TGA-Gre assumes that the lowest p ij in each iteration could lead to the best attack result. It avoids massive comparisons between iterations and thus can significantly accelerate the whole process. Similar to the procedure of TGATra, TGA-Gre also compares g t across all snapshots during each iteration. The major difference is that TGA-Gre elects a local optimal link in each iteration. It is clear that we only need to repeat op1 and op2 at most 2γn s times, which is much more efficient.
EXPERIMENTS

Datasets
We perform experiments on three real-world dynamic networks, with their basic statistics listed in Table 1 . • RADOSLAW [20] : It is an internal e-mail network between employees in a mid-sized manufacturing company. We focus on the nodes appeared in 2010-01 and construct network using their interactions from 2010-02-01 to 2010-09-30.
• LKML [21] : It is also an email network from the linux kernel mailing list. We focus on the users who appeared on the mailing list between 2007-01-01 and 2007-04-01 and slice the data during the next 12 months at an interval of 3 months.
• FB-WOSN [22] : It contains a small subset of posts to other users' walls on Facebook. We construct the dynamic network based on the data recorded between 2007-01-01 and 2009-01-01, and divide the data into 4 snapshots with an interval of 6 months. Each node represents a user that has made a post between 2006-07-01 and 2007-01-01.
Baseline Methods
As the first work to study adversarial attack on DNLP algorithms, we design three baseline attacks as follows, to compare with TGAGre and TGA-Tra.
• Random Attack (RA): RA randomly modifies γ linkages in all snapshots. In practice, we add b new connections to the target node and remove γ − b links between the target node and its neighbors. Here, we use RA to see the robustness of DNLP algorithms under random noises.
• Common-Neighbor-based Attack (CNA): CNA adds b links between node pairs with less common neighbors and remove γ − b links between those with more common neighbors. We adopt CNA as a baseline since common neighbor is the basis of many similarity metrics between pairwise nodes used for link prediction.
• Direct Gradient-based Attack (DGA): DGA recursively modify the linkage with maximum absolute gradient obtained by ∂L t /∂S(i, :), until the attack succeeds, or the number of modifications reaches γ. We use DGA as a baseline to address the importance of utilizing temporal information in attacking DNLP algorithms.
We set γ = 8 in all experiments and b = 4 for RA and CNA.
In TGA and DGA, we do not limit the proportion of added and removed links. We first train the models with original data, and then feed adversarial examples generated by DDNE to each model, to validate the effectiveness of the attacks.
Evaluation Metrics
We choose attack success rate (ASR) and average attack modification links (AML) as attack effectiveness criterion.
•
ASR:
The ratio of the amount of links that are successfully hidden to the total number of target links that can be correctly predicted in the target snapshot.
• AML: The average amount of perturbation to prevent each target link from being predicted. If it needs to modify at least q i links to hide link i, then AML is defined as
where m represents the number of target links. Note that q i ≤ γ and the equality holds when the attack fails.
Results
Firstly, we use the generated adversarial examples to fool the DDNE model to prevent target links from being predicted. We set γ = 10 to ensure the disguise of modification, which also leads the maximum of AML equal to 10. The results are presented in Table 2 . The two TGA methods outperform DGA in terms of both ASR and AML, while DGA is better than CNA and RA. The results suggest that: 1) the gradients of DDNE is critical to attack different DNLP methods; 2) utilizing temporal information can indeed significantly improve the attack effect. Moreover, we can see that the adversarial examples generated by DDNE can also be used to attack other DNLP algorithms, such as ctRBM, GTRBM and dynAERNN. Although the attack performance may be relatively inferior in these algorithms, the two TGA methods still behave better than the three baselines, indicating their transferability.
As expected, TGA-Tra behaves better than TGA-Gre, but the latter is much more efficient and thus more practical in realworld applications. Almost all the methods behave much better on FB-WOSN than the other two networks, indicating that sparser networks are relatively easier to be disturbed by adversarial attacks, that is, the DNLP algorithms on sparser networks are less robust. The significant gap of the performance between TGA-Tra and TGA-Gre overturns the hypothesis that the greatest drop of L t in each iteration does not lead to the best attack performance sometimes. This enlightens us to further explore specific meanings behind g t . We find that the performance of TGA-Tra and TGAGre are very similar in each iteration, but their routes seem totally different. By investigating these adversarial examples, we have the following two observations: • Second, TGA-Tra prefers to add rather than delete links, while TGA-Gre has the opposite tendency.
Such observations indicate that TGA-Tra could be more concealed than TGA-Gre, since people tend to pay more attention to recent events, e.g., link change in recent snapshots. On the other hand, TGA-Gre may be preferred if we want to get some short-term attack effect. Besides, TGA-Tra seems to have lower social cost, since adding links are always easier than deleting in our social circle.
Attack on Long-term Prediction
Besides focusing on the next immediate snapshot, researchers always look into the performance of DNLP algorithms on long-term prediction. Similarly, we would also like to investigate whether the two TGA methods are effective for hiding remote future links. We first make predictions for the 3 th , 4 th , 5 th and 6 th snapshot with n s = 2 and then compare the attack performance on different snapshots, as shown in Figure 3 . We can see that, generally, the performance of both TGA-Tra and TGA-Gre improve as we attack longer-term prediction, indicating that longer-term prediction is easier to be disturbed and thus is overall less robust against adversarial attacks.
Long-history Attack
Typically, larger n s means more historical information can be used in prediction, and thus may improve the performance of DNLP algorithms. Here, we are interested in whether the increase of n s can also help these algorithms resist adversarial attacks. We compare the attack performance of the two TGA methods on the three data sets with respect to different n s . In particular, we first apply DDNE with the input sequence varying from 2 to 4, and then generate adversarial examples. The results are shown in Figure 4 , where we can see that, indeed, the performance of both TGA-Tra and TGA-Gre decrease significantly as n s increases, indicating that larger n s makes DDNE more robust against adversarial attacks.
Adding-link Attack
In social networks, it is considered that deleting links is of higher social cost than adding operations. Moreover, temporal networks may also have multiple interactions between a pair of nodes. Therefore, deleting one link on a snapshot always removes all the corresponding interactions in the given interval. Due to this gap between the cost of deleting and adding links, we would like to investigate how the attack performance of the two TGA methods will be influenced if we just add, rather than rewire, links to the original networks. The results are presented in Table 3 , where we find that the performance of both TGA-Tra and TGAGre slightly decrease when we perform the attack only by adding links, especially on the network FB-WOSN. Such results indicate that, in certain cases, we can perform the cheap attack on DNLP by only adding a small number of links, at the cost of losing a little bit attack performance.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the first work of adversarial attack on DNLP, and propose the time-aware gradient, as well as two TGA methods, namely TGA-Tra and TGA-Gre, to realize the attack. We use these methods to attack the advanced DNLP algorithms, including DDNE, ctRBM, GTRBM and dynAERNN, on three real-world dynamic networks, and the results show that our TGA methods behave better than the other baselines, achieving the state-of-the-art attack performance. The fact that the adversarial examples generated by TGA on DDNE can also be used to effectively attack other DNLP algorithms validates the trasferability of TGA methods. Interestingly, we also find that long-term prediction seems to be more vulnerable to adversarial attacks, while using longer historical information can enhance the robustness of DNLP algorithms.
In the future, we will apply TGA methods to attack more DNLP algorithms, and further propose better strategies to improve their attack performance; on the other hand, we will also seek for methods to defend against such adversarial attacks, to achieve more robust DNLP algorithms.
